Методика оценки индивидуальной надежности уникальных конструкций by Timashev, S. A. & Тимашев, С. А.
5
vol. 5, № 1
2019
Methodology of Assessing Individual Reliability of Unique Structures
SAFETY OF BUILDING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES 
AND TERRITORIES 
DOI 10.15826/rjcst.2019.1.001 УДК 69.059.4
Timashev S. A. 
Ural Federal University,
Science and Engineering Centre “Reliability  
and Safety of Large Systems and Machines”, Ural Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences,
Ekaterinburg, Russia 
Old Dominion University, 
Norfolk, USA 
E‑mail: TimashevS@gmail.com
METHODOLOGY OF ASSESSING INDIVIDUAL RELIABILITY OF UNIQUE STRUCTURES
Abstract. The paper describes the author’s methodology of quantitative reliability assessment of unique systems that are 
components of very expensive critical/strategic infrastructures, manufactured in very small series/batches, or even as single, unique 
structures. It was dubbed “theory of individual structural reliability — TISR”. With the development of the 3D digital technology 
and digitization that opened the door to creating digital twins in design, the share of unique products is growing non-stop in 
all branches of contemporary heavy industry and machine-building (rotor excavators, continuous casting plants, drilling rigs), 
adjacent sectors of industry (ship-building, aircraft building), and construction industry (large span bridges, super high skyscrapers, 
exhibition pavilions etc.). In this paper the TISR methodology is described for a class of unique and non‑renewable objects using 
as an example a one-time-deployed-when-on-orbit robotic technological complex, designed to serve without interruption for 
12–15 years in the near-space environment. The paper is a direct extract from preprint [1], revised and translated into English 
by its first author. The initial data needed for writing paragraphs 4 and 6 of this paper belongs to Yu. P. Pokhabov, published 
elsewhere, which made the description of implementing the TISR methodology in the field of unique spacecraft design up to date.. 
The author greatly appreciates and acknowledges the provided input.
Keywords: assessment methodology, individual reliability, unique structures
Тимашев С. А.
Уральский федеральный университет, 
Научно-инженерный центр «Надежность и ресурс больших систем и машин» УрО РАН, 
Екатеринбург, Россия 
Университет Олд Доминион, 
Норфолк, США
E‑mail: TimashevS@gmail.com
МЕТОДИКА ОЦЕНКИ ИНДИВИДУАЛЬНОЙ НАДЕЖНОСТИ УНИКАЛЬНЫХ КОНСТРУКЦИЙ
Аннотация. Описана оригинальная методология количественной оценки надежности уникальных устройств/систем — 
компонент критических/стратегических инфраструктур, чрезвычайно дорогих технических объектов, изготавливаемых 
малыми сериями или даже в единичном экземпляре, которая получила название теория индивидуальной конструкционной 
надежности. Автором этой методики является С. А. Тимашев. К таким конструкциям относятся, например, уникальные 
большепролетные мосты, сверхвысокие небоскребы, выставочные павильоны. Доля уникальных изделий во всех отрас-
лях современного тяжелого машиностроения (роторные экскаваторы: установки непрерывной разливки стали) и смеж-
ных секторах промышленности (судо-, авиастроении) c развитием современных цифровых 3D‑технологий непрерывно 
растет. В данной статье метод оценки индивидуальной надежности рассмотрен на примере невосстанавливаемых склад-
ных телекоммуникационных спутников в виде робототехнических комплексов одноразового раскрытия, предназначен-
ных для бесперебойной работы в течение не менее 12–15 лет в условиях ближнего космоса. Статья является прямой 
выдержкой из препринта [1], отредактированной и переведенной на английский язык ее первым автором. Исходные 
данные, необходимые для написания параграфов 3 и 5 настоящей статьи, принадлежат Ю. П. Похабову, были приведе-
ны им ранее в других публикациях. Эти данные позволили актуализировать описание процедуры использования TISR 
при создании уникальных космических аппаратов, за что автор глубоко признателен Ю. П. Похабову.
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Introduction. Current state of the art
Despite the imperative importance of the problem, 
assessing the reliability of individual systems still remains 
one of the unresolved problems of the modern theory of 
structural reliability.
This is largely due to the fact that among the designers 
of and reliability specialists of such systems a stable (but 
deeply erroneous) opinion was formed that the modern 
theory of structural reliability is fundamentally incapable 
of solving this problem [1, 2]. The origin of this opin-
ion lies in the fact that classical structural reliability does 
not know how to construct. from a single-manufacture 
structure, the corresponding general sets (GS) of struc-
tural parameters values [3] that are absolutely needed for 
estimating their statistical distribution.
The corresponding GS for loads, impacts, and struc-
tural materials are quite accessible for construction and 
study, but do not exist in principle for the parameters of 
unique structures (US), and there are no adequate ways 
to create such GSs. Proposals [1, 2] to build virtual sets 
of such GSs based on institutional knowledge, expert 
judgment and common sense, or the results of computer 
modeling stumble upon the need to take into account the 
epistemic and aleatory components (that in this case are 
terra incognita) of such purely empirical models. Hence, 
the ad hoc construction of a virtual set of such GSs in-
evitably leads to unacceptably vague, fuzzy and largely 
speculative values of their possible stochastic properties, 
from which it is impossible to obtain the required robust 
(i. e., insensitive to small perturbations) quality estimates 
of highly reliable systems.
The specificity of unique systems, that must be tak-
en into account during their design, in addition to their 
uniqueness and non-renewableness, is in that their de-
signers have to [4]:
• strictly abide with the unconditional weight, size
restrictions and other requirements of the cus-
tomer;
• take into consideration that the US are multi-
component systems/infrastructures;
• account for the ability of such systems to fail, in
general, according to a set of heterogeneous cri-
teria of failure;
• account for the effects of combinations of vari-
ous, possibly interdependent, specific loads and
effects in the form of stochastic functions of time, 
physical characteristics of near space (in this
case, part of the effects on the system is gener-
ated inside the system itself);
• keep in mind that the structures are designed out
of a large number of heterogeneous structural
materials and elements;
• account for the fact that the US is assembled from 
units, components, and parts from manufactur-
ers with different levels of production culture,
which arrive at the place of assembly product by
different transportation means;
• take into consideration the heterogeneous human 
factor in terms of its competencies and skills at all
stages of the US life time (design, manufacture,
assembly, testing and debugging).
The conservatism of design and technological solu-
tions used when creating US allows only qualitative as-
sessments of their (supposedly high) reliability, and does 
not guarantee the necessary quality. Below the basics 
are described of the theory of individual structural reli-
ability (TISR), originally developed for the design of 
such multicomponent systems as steel and reinforced 
concrete multi-span and multi-story frames, subjected 
to combinations of random Markov type loads [5–9]. 
Subsequently, this methodology was used to assess in-
dividual structural reliability of oil and gas main pipe-
lines [10, 11], as well as in the design of the framework of 
nuclear reactors. In this paper, the TISR is described in 
relation to pivotal elements of unique telecommunication 
deployable-on-orbit sputniks.
1. The main provisions of the theory of individu-
al structural reliability 
To understand the further discussion, we briefly out-
line the main points of the TISR [6–9]. First, we note 
that the problem of accounting for various inherent un-
certainties facing all scientific and engineering disciplines 
received its initial solution in structural mechanics, 
where the concept of the limit state of a system was de-
veloped. The design methodology based on this concept 
was called the “load — resistance/strength” calculation 
scheme.
Over time, it turned out that this methodology is 
universal and can be successfully applied not only to 
assessing structural reliability of any engineering struc-
tures/infrastructures, products of machine-ship-aircraft 
construction and space technology, but also in assess-
ing their functional reliability, as well as to solve a num-
ber of important technical and economic problems [7]. 
The idiom “load — resistance” is replaced by “demand — 
supply” (in economic problems), “demand — inventory” 
in transportation and logistics tasks in manufacture, 
production, warehousing and storage), “need (neces‑
sity) — possibility of satisfying it”, respectively (in resil-
ience, security and strategic readiness of infrastructures, 
and provision of social services). The stochastic idiom 
“supply — demand” in economics can be considered as 
a probabilistic analogue of the equations of equilibrium 
Ключевые слова: методология оценки, индивидуальная надежность, уникальные конструкции
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and compatibility of deformations in the mechanics of 
deformable systems. Thus, in the general case, the load 
(demand, etc.) is understood as the impact or stressor on 
the system of any nature (physical, economic, logistic, 
social, etc.), which can lead to failure or affect its output 
effect. Accordingly, resistance (strength, supply, stock, 
satisfaction of demand, etc.) should be understood as 
the inherent property of the designed system to withstand 
the load impact [7].
For further discussion, we need an understanding of 
the nature of the general set for the properties of an indi-
vidual product, which, as mentioned above, is still con-
sidered absent by designers of and reliability specialists in 
the field of the US, because, due to its uniqueness, it 
does not belong to any really existing GS of homogene-
ous structures, and it is impossible to reliably build an 
adequate virtual GS — a mathematical model for an US.
Nevertheless, even for a single, unique structure it is 
possible to build its GS, which, however, will have a 
completely different nature and meaning. To build such 
a GS, this unitary design should be comprehensively and 
repeatedly measured and diagnosed at each stage of its 
manufacture, assembly, debugging and testing. Since it is 
known from measurement theory that the true dimen-
sions and any other physical indicators of an object are 
fundamentally immeasurable (in the sense that all meas-
urements inevitably contain measurement errors — ME), 
having such sets of measurements (obtained by using 
non-destructive testing methods), of material properties 
actually used when creating the unique system, its overall 
geometry and the dimensions of its parts, dimensional 
chains, etc.) it is possible to construct corresponding his-
tograms for the physical properties of the materials and 
components actually used in a unique product, and from 
them — the probability density function (PDF) of MEs 
of all the parameters that are important for reliability as-
sessment if the US.
The more accurate the measurements, the narrower is 
the PDF curve (compare Fig. 1 with Figs. 2–4). It should 
be borne in mind that the variability of the properties 
of materials and critical parameters of such structures 
should be minimal (Fig. 3–5) and not determined by the 
dispersion of the properties of a real or virtual set of simi-
lar products, but exclusively by the accuracy and preci-
sion of measuring these properties and parameters at all 
stages of creating this unique product sample. With this 
approach, all the statistics necessary to solve the reliabil-
ity problem are in principle accessible and can be collected 
during the design, construction, manufacture, assembly, 
testing, debugging of the device, and their subsequent in-
terpretation. However, this knowledge (and the very 
possibility of applying the TISR) requires appropriate 
Fig. 1. Visualization of the classical problem 
of structural reliability according  
to the “load — resistance” scheme
Fig. 2. Spreading (increasing the distance between 
the load PDF and resistance PDF)  
to increase product reliability
Fig. 3. The classic problem  
of individual reliability (the resistance 
PDF is obtained by measurements 
and diagnostics)
Fig. 4. Solving the problem of individual 
reliability using one realization  
(one quantile of resistance)
Fig. 5. Spreading of the PDFs 
 of load and resistance in the prob-
lem of individual reliability  
(including by design  
and technological solutions)
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organizational efforts and a production culture (as a rule, 
much higher than the existing culture).
2. The main schemes for calculating
the individual structural reliability 
of deformable systems
We turn to the description of the basic schemes for 
calculating individual structural reliability of deformable 
systems.
The first, basic calculation scheme radically solves the 
dimensionality curse of the reliability problem of a mul-
ticomponent system, which is exposed to a combination 
of loads and influences of various nature, taking into ac-
count physical, technical, technological and operational 
aspects. In the classical approach, the dimension of the 
structural reliability problem is equal to the product of the 
number of structural elements of the system and the num-
ber of loads and impacts on it. In the calculation scheme 
described below, this dimension is equal to or less than 
the number of loads on the system, which can be 10–10 4 
(10 5) times less than in the classical case [6–8]. This 
scheme is ideally suited for the main cases of calculating 
the US reliability when a combination of random loads 
and influences acts on the structure, or when internal or 
external influences are more adequately described by step-
wise (non-differentiable) time processes, or when the task 
requires calculating the probabilities of a random process 
not exceeding low levels [6–8]. It consists of four stages.
At the first stage, the system is schematized, i. e., the 
space Q of the input parameters q and the space U of the 
output parameters u are selected. This introduces the op-
erator of the system L:
Lu q u U q Q= О О, , .  (1) 
The choice of the mathematical operator L is made on 
the basis of technical and economic considerations, tak-
ing into account technological, operational requirements, 
as well as the capabilities of available computing facilities.
At the second stage, elements k , kо , kc  are distin-
guished in the operator L, where k , kо  are, respectively, 
elements from the space K of deterministic system prop-
erties that are not subject to ( k ) and are subject to op-
timization ( kо ); kc  — elements of the space Kc of those 
properties of the system that are considered random.
At the third stage, the subspace of quality V Н U is 
determined from the solution of the inverse problem 
of mechanics in the space U, and from it the admissi-
ble domain (AD) W0 kc( )  in the space Q is determined. 
Currently, the choice of the space V is not algorithmi-
cized and largely depends on intuition and the experience 
of the designer (and/or the reliability speciaist).
At the fourth stage, the conditional reliability of the 
system is found:
R t P q ty c( ) = ( )О ( ) Ј Јйл щыt k tW0 0, (2) 
and using it, the complete/full reliability:
R t R t f d
c
y c c( ) = ј ( ) ( )т т
k
k k .  (3) 
Thus, according to this scheme, the problem of indi-
vidual structural reliability is always solved in the space 
of loads or, as will be shown below, in the space of criti‑
cal structural parameters of the system. Using this scheme 
simplifies the stochastic problem as much as possible and 
reduces the dimension of the problem by one, two or 
more orders of magnitude.
In the scheme described above, the admissible re-
gion is constructed according to equation 
v H q c* ,= ( )k �
where v*  is the maximum permissible value of the system 
quality vector; H is the operator inverse to operator L.
The operators L, H reflect the level of complexity of 
formulation of the deterministic problem (since the value 
of the vector kc � is fixed). This means that each time the 
reliability of a specific (individual) design is considered, 
which is solved taking into account modern achieve-
ments in the mechanics of deformable media and the 
capabilities of available computing resources. Such an 
approach allows one to construct partial admissible re-
gions in the space Q according to each i-th quality crite-
rion (Fig. 6, a) 
Their intersection gives an admissible region accord-
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In this way, it is not difficult to find areas where any 
one, two, three, etc. types of failure occur simultaneous-
ly. For example, according to Fig. 6, a
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If for a multi-element system (engineering structure) 
it is possible to construct a permissible region for each 
element by some criterion (Fig. 6, b), their intersection 
will give an permissible region for the system as a whole, 
according to the same criterion. Performing this proce-
dure for all quality criteria, it is possible to reduce to the 
diagram of Fig. 6 the problem of finding the permissible 
area for a system by all quality criteria.
The advantages of this approach are the visibility 
and ease of interpretation of the essence of the problem. 
Indeed, even before calculating the reliability function, 
the designer already knows which quality criteria are 
the most stringent (in Fig. 6, a, these are criteria i and 
i + 1), which elements do not participate in the formation 
of an acceptable region (for example, in Fig. 6, b — el-
ements 3, 5 and 6). This allows selecting elements with 
excessive reliability and outline constructive measures to 
reduce their reliability (and, accordingly, the mass of the 
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US) to a level that does not affect the overall reliability of 
the system.
Fig. 6. Permissible areas in the space of loads 
If the task is considered as managing reliability of an 
US system in the class of a two-level management policy, 
then the warning U *  and physical U **  failures are tak-
en into account (Fig. 6, c).
A warning failure means a certain state of the system, 
that signals a possible violation of its functioning in the 
near future, or a failure that causes slight damage. The 
permissible areas for each failure are shown in Fig. 6, c, 
from which it is clear that U U* **О  and W WU U** *( ) > ( ) .
The task now is to prevent the load vector from exiting 
the domain W U *( )  or, if it already exited, to prevent the 
occurrence of a physical failure — the exit of q (τ) from 
the domain W U **( ) . To do this, it is needed to know 
what time it will take for q (τ) to cover the distance from 
the border Г U *( )  to the border Г U **( ) , and what meth-
od and control tool to use to implement this policy. In 
this paper, these tasks are not considered, but they may 
be necessary in assessing the reliability of a new genera-
tion of USs (equipped with self-diagnosis and monitor-
ing subsystems) at the stage of their operation in orbit.
Since admissible regions are constructed for 
a fixed value of the random vector kc , the reliability func-
tion obtained with their help is conditional. Integrating it 
with the weight (weight ratio) f ck( )  gives an uncondi-
tional reliability function. Thus, all randomness is con-
centrated in the admissible region (its form and size). 
The PDF f ck( )  is constructed in the process of creating 
an individual manufacture.
Under the influence of physical and chemical stress-
ors, the quality of structures changes over time. In this 
case, the second scheme for assessing the reliability of a 
mechanical device is used. The first two stages of the as-
sessment remain the same, and the conditional reliability 
function is written as 
R t P q ty c( ) = ( )О ( ) Ј Јйл щыt t k tW0 0,  (6) 
i. e., it is determined at each moment of time taking into
account the effect of “shrinking” of the admissible region 
(Fig. 7).
Fig. 7. Permissible time-varying region 
If a conservative stepwise approximation of the ad-
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-, t t t1
� � � � � �� � � � � � � �k i= - ј =1 1 00, , , t (7) 
since the reliability of a system aging in this way should 
be calculated according to a series connection scheme. 
The rule for calculating complete reliability (3) remains 
unchanged.
In some cases, the task is posed from the very begin-
ning as a problem of durability, for example, when con-
sidering long-term and low-cycle strength, high-cycle 
fatigue, stability under creep, etc. Here the third scheme 
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for calculating the system reliability is used, according to 
which at the first stage the deterministic durability is cal-
culated 
T L q c= ( ),k � (8) 
where q is the vector of external influence; L is the 
operator.
When choosing the operator L, the quality space 
and the region of admissible states are automatically as-
signed, since without solving these issues it is not pos-
sible to uniquely determine the operator. At the second 
stage, elements kc  randomness are distinguished that are 
carriers of in the operator L.
At the third stage, the method of conditional func-
tions is used to find the durability PDF 
f T f d
c T




k k (9) 
where f ck( )  is the joint parameter density kc ; �y kc( ) is 
defined by equation (8).
In some cases, it is possible to immediately determine 
the moments of stochastic durability. Then, the durabil-
ity PDF is constructed using the robust Gram — Charlier 
or Edgeworth series expansion, as well as using the maxi-
mum entropy method.
At the fourth stage, the system reliability is sought 
R t f T dT
t
( ) = ( )т
0
(10) 
The described schemes for calculating reliability 
of unique mechanical systems complement each other 
and allow giving reliability assessment for all practical 
cases.
In all schemes, the reliability function R t( )  is defined 
as the result of taking into account the most important 
environmental factors, system properties, technological 
and operational requirements.
In the case of predicting reliability of a single func-
tioning system following calculation scheme can be used. 
Based on equations (1) and (4), an admissible region 
Wq t( )  is constructed in a space Q of dimension m at 
time t and the coordinates of the image point d xq( ) �
are determined. In this space, the depicting point 
x x x xq m= ј{ }1 2, , ,�  means the point whose coordinates 
are the loads and effects acting on the system at the time 
of analysis t. If d xq q( )ОW , then the reliability of the sys-
tem is � �R t( ) є1 , if d xq q( )ПW , then R t( ) є 0 .
Based on the kinetic equations obtained from meas-
urements and observations of the parameters x of the sys-
tem over time t, the evolution equation of the admissible 
region is determined 
W Wq q xt t( ) = ( ), (11) 
where x is the vector of parameters that determine the 
configuration and size of the permissible region.
Using prior data on the loads and processes of qual-
ity loss of the system q t( )  using the Bayesian approach, 
posterior characteristics of the same processes q a( ) ( )t  
are constructed, and from them the probability is sought 
P x P q x t Ta qt t t t, ,( ) = ( )О ( ) < Јйл щы
( ) W (12) 
and predicted reliability 
 R P x f x xp t t( ) = ( ) ( )т , d (13)
where f x( ) �  is the joint PDF of quantities x (the integral is 
taken over the region of existence of x).
Another way to calculate the reliability function is as 
follows:














т ( ) d  (14) 
where rt  is the distance to the boundary of the admissible 
region at time t, �vd
a( ) ( )t  is the posterior relative velocity 
of approach of the image point and the boundary of the 
admissible region obtained from the measurement results 
during the time [0, t].
If forecasting yields unsatisfactory results, it is nec-
essary to correct the models of the observed random 
processes, reduce the time between the moments of 
measurements, and increase the depth of control. Usually 
the forecast depth T t t-( ) Ј / .10  
Possessing the calculation schemes described above, 
the designer can provide the necessary level of reliabil-
ity for each admissible area (see Fig. 3, 5). If the cost 
of multiple measurements is too high, then use a small 
sample size (< 25–30) and apply to it the bootstrap/re-
selection procedure, that will allow obtaining the desired 
probabilities with the necessary consistency. It is also 
possible to select a quantile (say, of the order of 0.001) 
of material strength and solve the reliability problem 
with its help (see. Fig. 4). Thus, in the framework of 
the presented methodology, individual structural reli-
ability is just a special kind of general theory of struc-
tural reliability. As noted above, for its use in practice it is 
necessary to have a technology and production culture 
available that allows collecting, at each technological op-
eration, all the necessary, sufficient and consistent sta-
tistical information about the parameters of the unique 
structure. The costs of changing the technological cul-
ture of production quickly pay off, since they make up 
no more than 5–10 % of the cost of one unsuccessful 
launch of a unique satellite. It should be noted that the 
concept of such a technology developed at the Science 
and Engineering Center “Reliability and Safety of Large 
Systems and Machines”, Ural Branch, Russian Academy 
of Sciences, for assessing reliability, likelihood of failure 
and residual life of individual sections of trunk oil and 
gas pipelines, has been recognized in the global pipeline 
industry [10, 11].
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3. The application of TISR to reliability
analysis of a unique telecommunication 
satellite pivoting rod
To visualize the capabilities of TISR as applied to 
spacecraft, we will demonstrate them on a real-life exam-
ple of evaluating the complex individual structural reli-
ability of an one-time pivoting single-link rod of a GPS 
satellite magnetometer (see Fig. 8).
The structural scheme of the rod without a mag-
netometer is shown in Fig. 9. In the general case, in-
struments and equipment for various purposes, such as 
antennas, solar panels, orientation, stabilization devices, 
etc., necessary for operating the on-board systems of the 
spacecraft, as well as scientific equipment, can be placed 
on the free end of the rod.
In the folded position φn the rod (1) is fixed on the 
support base of the US using a lock (2). After stripping, 
lock (2) releases rod (1), which, under the action of push-
er (3) and torsion spring (not shown in Fig. 9) installed in 
hinge (4), is rotated and fixed in its final angular position 
φk using latch (5) (not shown in Fig. 9).
The solution of the problem in a stochastic formula-
tion using the classical reliability theory of [4, 9] reduces 
the problem of reliability of the rotation of the rod to en-
suring two conditions:
• strength — resistance to loads, when folded and
when locked in the working position;
• functioning during rotation of the rod — the ex-
cess of the driving moment on the drive over the
moment of resistance forces (hinge and the final
position latch) both along the entire travel path
and at its very end.
Fig. 9. US GPS with deployed open solar panels 
and magnetometer rod 
Such solution of the problem is crucial when choos-
ing the parameters of the rod’s performance at the design 
stage; however, it does not take into account the struc-
tural and technological factors during final design, tech-
nological preparation and production.
The failure-free operation of the rod is ensured by the 
sequential execution by its structural elements of the fol-
lowing functions (conditions) [3, 4]:
• preservation of the strength/integrity of the rod
when loaded in the folded position;
• prevention of unauthorized removal of mechani-
cal ties in the lock;
• the passage of an electrical signal to the elec-
tric igniter of the pyro-cartridge according to a
given command;
Fig. 8. US GPS with deployed open solar panels and magnetometer rod
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• triggering/activating of the pyro-device;
• separation of mechanical bonds in the lock;
• separation of the rod from the support base (US);
• rotation of the rod by a given angle;
• fixing the rod in the working position;
• providing the specified parameters of the rod in
the working position.
For this example, there are at least nine conditions 
that must be unconditionally met for a successful rod 
turn. Any of the conditions can be divided into a num-
ber of subconditions (as branches of the possible causes 
of failures of critical elements within the framework of 
the main functional condition), each of which should 
be reflected in the technical (design and technological) 
documentation by establishing certain requirements for 
manufacturing and technical control. Moreover, failure 
for each of the conditions (subconditions) is determined 
not only by the genesis of the causes of failures (accepted 
design and technological solutions at the pre-operational 
stages of the life cycle), but also by the conditions of the 
operating modes, which should be taken into account 
when analyzing and evaluating their reliability.
For a pivoting rod, the fulfillment of each of the above 
conditions is possible if there are no reasons for the failure 
of critical elements of its structure. The set of such reasons 
depends on the individual specifics of the rod design [3, 4]. 
A set of possible causes of failures for each of the conditions 
for the rotation of the rod, given in [3, 4] is listed below.
1. The condition for ensuring the strength/integrity of
the rod from loads in the folded position. The rea-
sons for failure during deployment of the rod due
to violation of this condition may be: the destruc-
tion of structural elements of the locks and open-
ing mechanisms (loss of bearing capacity); plastic
deformations in the executive bodies and of the
opening mechanisms’ interfaces that worsen their
work (unacceptable deformations); changes in the
relative positions of the mechanism parts during vi-
bration (insufficient vibration resistance); unac-
ceptable thinning of the solid lubricating layer in
tribo-conjugations (violation of lubrication condi-
tions); unacceptable amplitudes of vibro-displace-
ments, leading to the ingress of foreign objects into
the mechanism of opening (deployment blocking);
impaired mobility in highly loaded structural ele-
ments of mechanisms in vacuum (cold welding).
2. The condition for preventing unauthorized removal 
of mechanical ties in the lock. In addition to the de-
struction of locks, the causes of failure can be the
following phenomena: electrostatic breakdown,
leading to self-operation (self-opening) of the
lock — the initiator of opening; unacceptable defor-
mations in the locks (unacceptable deformation).
3. The condition for the passage of the electric sig-
nal to the electric igniter of the pyro-cartridge
according to a given command. The causes of
failure may be: a mechanical break in the supply
wire or oxidation of the contact (open circuit).
4. The condition for triggering the pyrodevice.
The reasons for its failure may be: failure of the
pyro-check, non-destruction of the check, non-
release of the mechanical connection between
the pyrodevice and the lock (for example, due to
the ingress of glue).
5. The condition of non-separation of mechanical
bonds in the lock. The causes of failure may be: in-
sufficient motion space of the actuators; insufficient 
energy of the lock drive springs; intrusion of isolat-
ed particles into the lock mechanism; incorrect ad-
justment of the lock mechanism elements (neglect
of possible shifts under the influence of gravity), etc.
6. The condition for the separation of the rod from
the support base. The causes of failure may be:
jamming of the movable elements of the lock due
to installation and thermal deformations; interfer-
ence on the movement path of the detachable parts 
of the lock when leaving the interface zone with
the immovable parts; insufficient energy of the de-
ployment opening drives to overcome rest friction.
7. The condition for rotating the rod at a given
angle. The reasons for failure under this condition
can be: malfunction of the drive (failure to turn
on), lack of necessary torque reserves (braking),
disappearance of the radial clearance in the rota-
tion hinge (press-in), disappearance of the axial
clearance in the hinge assembly (jamming), sudden
obstacles to the movement of the rod (meshing).
8. The condition for fixing the rod in the working
position. The cause of failures is the insufficient
energy of the drives to snap the latches of the end
position of the rod, the release of the end position 
of the rod under the action of an external load.
9. Conditions for ensuring the specified parameters
of the rod in the working position. The causes of
failures under this condition may be destruction
and deformation of the structural elements of the
rod with the instantaneous application of me-
chanical ties at the time of fixating the rod; insuf-
ficient rigidity of the rod; presence of backlash in
hinges; insufficient accuracy of positioning the
rod in the working position; insufficient accuracy
of the shape of the working surface of the equip-
ment placed on the rod during the period of its
active existence; insufficient local strength of the
structural elements of the rod during operation of 
the propulsion system that corrects the orbit or
orientation of the apparatus.
The listed conditions can be divided into groups accord-
ing to the physical principles of their manifestation [3, 4]:
• conditions of the structural strength of the rod
at various stages of its operation (at the time pre-
ceding its rotation to the working position, when
locked in the final position, etc.);
• temporal conditions (taboo on premature open-
ing of the lock with rod in the starting position;
ensuring the initiation of the rod deployment
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process at a given moment of time; removing kin-
ematic links of the rod with the support base at a 
given moment of time, etc.);
• kinematic conditions (ensuring freedom of rota‑
tion in the hinge in any angular position of the
rod, and unimpeded movement of the rod along a
given path, etc.);
• tribological conditions (presence at all times of
a separating lubricating layer in places of con-
tact interaction of moving units; the lubricant
resistance to abrasion during vibration exposure
to the loads of the active phase of satellite launch;
the lubricant resistance to abrasion after check-
ing the functioning of opening mechanisms dur-
ing ground tests, etc.);
• energy conditions (overcoming rest friction in the
rod hinge during initial straggling and ensuring
energy sufficiency for pivoting the rod to the full
design angle of rotation, including for fixing in
the working position, etc.);
• conditions for positioning accuracy (absence of
backlash in the hinges after installing the rod in
the working position, absence of irreversible de-
formations and fractures, absence of geometric
distortions due to aging processes, etc.).
All these conditions are tied to strict sequence or syn-
chronization of execution. To solve this problem, it is 
necessary to fulfill all the nine conditions with the same, 
very high probability. In a successful launch, all these 
probabilities become equal to unity.
Hence, the problem under consideration is reduced to 
assessing the functional reliability of a one-time action mech-
anism, which is much more complicated than the usual cal-
culation of structural reliability of a mechanical system.
We now present the described procedure in more de-
tail for the case of assessing the reliability of the process 
of error-free rotation of the rod (Fig. 9). To do this, we 
consider the algorithms for constructing admissible areas 
(AA) and limit state functions (LSF) for each of the nine 
types of failure of the bar turn. Before this, we consider 
the main methods and specifics of building AA in the 
space of loads, physic-mechanical and structural param-
eters of a specific designed make.
4. Specifics of constructing the LSF
and AA in the framework of TISR
The construction of the LSF and admissible area (AA) 
are the determining steps in assessing individual structur-
al reliability. When formulating the LSFs for an already 
designed structure according to existing canons, equa-
tions and algorithms are used that connect its parametric 
properties with loads and influences to resist which it was 
created. At the same time, it is assumed that the design 
satisfies all the weight, size, cost and functional require-
ments of the technical specifications (TS) for this project.
According to the LSF formed in this way, the corre-
sponding AA is constructed. To do this, it is necessary 
to solve the corresponding inverse problems of mechanics 
and those sections of knowledge to which its design func-
tions relate. In the context of structural reliability, such 
loads and impacts are sought for which certain ultimate 
conditions arise in the system elements (yield strength, 
ultimate strength, low-cycle strength, high-cycle fatigue, 
buckling load, maximum allowable deflections, defor-
mations, etc.). Here it is also necessary to consider such 
generalized characteristics of the product as maximum 
allowable rigidity and accuracy of positioning (not only 
of individual nodes — hinges, rods, reflectors, but also 
the US as a whole).
In addition to the classical design scheme “load — re‑
sistance”, in a comprehensive assessment of spacecraft 
reliability, it is necessary to use generalized versions of 
this scheme, when the load and resistance are some pa-
rameters of the structure itself, which indirectly depend 
on external or internal loads and influences. Such cas-
es include all tasks associated with clearances in joints. 
To solve this type of problems, it is necessary to use the 
multi-criteria stochastic optimization method as applied 
to multidimensional systems.
Here we note that the issues of rigidity of products 
directly depend on the manufacturing accuracy of parts 
and assemblies. This problem was first posed in [6, 7] 
and solved in relation to the manufacturing technology 
and assessment of the assembleability and initial reliabili‑
ty of steel building structures in [9, 12, 13]. The results of 
these studies were fully implemented at the Chelyabinsk 
Plant of Metal Structures in 1978–1979 and were used in 
compiling the USSR State Standard “Limit deviations 
of the geometric parameters of steel building structures” 
in 1986. This approach was also used by SEC of the Ural 
Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences in assessing 
the assembleability of nuclear reactor designs.
5. Technology of applying the methodology
of individual structural reliability
When applying the TISR methodology, following 
technology is used.
At the first stage, the designer, guided by the approved 
TS, and using the entire mandatory arsenal of all levels 
regulatory documents for the design of US, his personal 
experience and vision, creates a deterministic version of 
the object, with all its parameters known.
At the second stage, for the already designed object, 
the LSFs are built using all the known design limiting 
states for materials (yield strength, ultimate strength, 
etc.), as well as for elements, assemblies, aggregates and 
the system as a whole, taking them from the approved TS 
for its design, and other affordable sources.
At the third stage, for each LSF its permissible re-
gion is built in the space of its parameters that determine 
performance quality of the element or the system as a 
whole. Depending on the quality of the initial statistics, 
the boundaries of the AAs can be deterministic, quan-
tiles, or have their own PDF.
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At the fourth stage, the problem is solved of assessing 
probability of the element or system quality vector exiting 
from its AA.
The second and third stages of assessing the reliabil-
ity of the US using TISR are the platform for interaction 
between the designer and the individual reliability spe-
cialist, since they synergistically complement each other, 
working with the same materiel, but considering it from 
different, complementary points of view.
Due to lack of space when demonstrating capabilities 
of TISR methodology restrict ourselves to analyzing the 
fulfillment of the condition for rotation of the rod by a given 
angle [3, 4]. The choice of this condition is due, on the 
one hand, to the nature of failures, that allows full dem-
onstration of the basic principles of obtaining an individ-
ual structural reliability assessment. On the other hand, 
the reasons of failure that characterize nonfulfillment of 
this condition are universal, independent of the design of 
the pivoting rod.
1. The “drive failure” type. This type of failure refers
to structural reliability. Failure (sudden, unrecoverable) 
can be caused by a breakdown of the drive during launch-
ing the US into orbit, for example, due to mechanical 
destruction of the opening spring or violation of the elec-
trical contacts of the electromechanical drive (gear mo-
tor) caused by vibrations during the active phase of the 
launch. Typically, drives have a unified modular design 
and are used in homogeneous environmental conditions. 
Hence, it is possible to obtain for them an experimental 
operating time function.
R n NN = / � (15) 
where n is the number of non-failed drives during 
ground-based experimental testing and flight practice; 
N is the total number of drives in the sample.
The reliability condition for the drive taking into ac-
count (15) is written as 
R PN > lim � (16) 
where Plim  is the probability of failure-free operation 
of the drive in accordance with the specified design 
requirement of the reliability indicator for the rod.
In case of non-compliance with condition (16), the 
required reliability of the drive is ensured by the m-th du-
plication multiplicity of its critical elements (structural or 
functional) according to formula 
R Rd N
m
= - -( ) +1 1 1 .   (17) 
2. The “brakes on rod” type of failure. This failure
Q(t) can occur if the magnitude of the driving moment 
M 0 t( )  for some reason is less than the moment of resist-
ance forces M r t( )
Q M M tr оt t t t( ) = ( ) - ( )йл щы < Ј Ј{ }0 0 0;
where tо is the moment of failure.
In engineering practice, it is assumed for the condi-
tion M M r0 >  to be met at every point in the trajectory 
of the pivoting rod under the condition of zero kinetic 
energy. The visualization of this process is presented 
in Fig. 10. In it, the LSF is the OO’B’B plane, AA is 
the region OABB’A’O’ (upper trihedral parallelepiped), 
where the segment OO’ is the estimated time of the 
opening of the rod. The lower trihedral box represents 
the failure area.
Curve 1 describes the successful deployment of the 
rod; curves 2 and 3 — fatal failure (rod deployment did 
not occur).
The designer’s task is to ensure the start moving con-
dition using almost (practically) absolutely reliable (repeat-
edly tested) structural and technological techniques (18) 
P M M r0 0 1 0t t t( ) > ( ) =йл щы ®, ,� (18) 
and the full deployment condition (19) 















, � � � � � � � �
(19) 
where tr  is the completion time of the rod turn.
Fig. 10. Visualization: successful turn of the rod, the left figure (curve 1); functional failure  
of the opening of the rod (curves 2, 3); the right figure shows the PDF of the driving moment 
(top left) and the moment of resistance forces (right) 
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The magnitude of the driving moment M 0 t( )  de-
pends on the type of drive and its operating parameters. 
For mechanical drives (torsion bars, torsion springs, 
watch springs, tension springs), the driving moment is 
determined by the following parameters:
• spring dimensions (in the general case, wire and
spring diameters, spring length);
• spring materials (strength and stiffness param-
eters);
• a method of creating a rotating moment (“pure”
rotation or by a pair of forces: in the latter case,
for example, if a tensile spring is used as a drive,
the value of the rotating moment is affected by the 
action shoulder of the force vector, which gener-
ally has a spread due to the distance between the
point of force application and the axis of rotation
and in itself changes during the movement of the
pivoting structure);
• adjustment (installation) of the spring at the ini-
tial moment of assembly of the pivoting structure;
• construction opening angle.
All the above factors are determined by technological 
tolerances.
In general terms, the driving moment for a mechani-
cal drive as a function of time can be expressed by the 
formula 
M f T Tp en c en0 j t J J j t t, , , ,( ) = ( ) ( ) ( ){ }   (20)
where Jp  is the generalized design parameter of the 
spring; Jc  — generalized structural characteristics of 
the spring in the assembly of the rotating structure; Ten  
is the ambient temperature; φ is the angle of rotation of 
the structure to the moment of fixation (contact with the 
retainer of the final position of the pivoting structure).
The moment of resistance forces in the path of the 
rod movement is determined by the friction forces in the 
hinge and the bending (torsion) resistance of the inter-
panel cable bundle (in the general case: electrical, low-
current, coaxial).
In general, the moment of resistance forces �M r t( )  as 
a function of time can be expressed by formula 
M f N T r k T lr en enj t j m n j t t, , , , , , , ,( ) = ( ) ( ) ( )йл щы{ }� �  (21)
where N is the transverse force acting on the axis, which is 
determined depending on the method of creating the 
moving moment; μ — coefficient of sliding friction in 
the hinge; r is the radius of the hinge; k is stiffness of the 
cable bundle (as a rule, to reduce the rigidity, the cable 
bundles in the interpanel zone are “fluffed”, that is, each 
wire in the cable bundle can be deformed independently); 
ν is a parameter depending on the position of the bundle 
between the fixed attachment points with respect 
to the hinge axis (usually the tendency is to make 
the intermediate rotating bundle support coaxial with 
the axis of hinge rotation); l is the length of the bundle 
between the fixed mounting points on the structure.
The reliability function of the rod rotation depending 
on the angle, taking into account (20) and (21), is 
R P M M tr r0 0 0 0 0t j t j t j j tk( ) = ( ) - ( )йл щы > Ј Ј Ј Ј{ }, , , ,� � � � � � � �
(22) 
Formula (22) uses the “load — resistance” reliability 
model, in which the moment of resistance forces M r  
acts as “load”, and the driving moment M 0  as “resist‑
ance”. The admissible region is the range of values of the 
driving moments M 0,  developed by the drive at the rota-
tion angle of the rod, greater than M r  at all time instants 
0 Ј Јt tr  (see Fig. 9).
To calculate R0 t( ) , it is necessary to build random 
functions (RF) M 0  and M r  (or to know their charac-
teristics — expectation, variance, correlation function, 
spectral density), or construct its PDF if they are pre-
sented in the form of random variables (RV). This re-
quires the use of the apparatus of statistical dynamics and 
the theory of random functions.
The values of the parameters in formulas (20)–(21) 
can be obtained by measuring the magnitudes of the driv-
ing moments and the resistance forces moments during 
ground-based experimental testing, taking into account 
simulation of the thermal conditions of outer space [3, 14].
3. The “ hinge jamming” type of failure. Failure
(sudden, restorable or non-restorable) can be caused by 
the sudden disappearance of the radial clearance in the 
hinge due to a change in the thickness of the layer of the 
solid lubricating coating and temperature deformations 
(Fig. 13). The condition for operability as related to radial 
clearance is determined by the formula 
D0 2 0 0t d t d t d t t, , , , ;T T T T tn pr f( ) = ( ) - ( ) - ( ) > Ј Ј
 (23) 
where D0  is the radial clearance in the hinge; δ is the 
minimum design clearance in the interface between the 
male and female hinge parts without taking into account 
the lubricant layer between them; d tn ( )  is the maximum 
thickness of the solid lubricant, taking into account its 
possible changes during operation from grinding and 
temperature; δpr — the maximum value of thermal 
deformations of the hinge structural elements in the radial 
clearance during volumetric expansion (compression) of 
the covered (covering) part; T is the temperature in the 
conjunction of the hinge parts; t f  — time (duration) of 
operation.
From formula (23) it follows that the rod reliability 
can be assessed using the “load — resistance” reliability 
model, if under the load we mean the time-varying pa-
rameters of radial clearance δr due to possible changes in 
the dimensions of the mating parts during operation of 
the US caused by thermal deformations, δr = 2δn + δpr, 
and, under resistance, the parameter δ, which opposes 
the change in load. In this case, the reliability function 
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related to maintaining a nonzero radial clearance in the 
bearing, taking into account the above expressions δ and 
δr, can be represented by formula 
R P T T tr r ft d t d t t( ) = ( ) - ( )йл щы > Ј Ј{ }, , ,0 0� � � � �   (24)
The admissible area in the quality space in the case of 
hinge wedging/jamming is the area of change of the ini-
tial (design) clearance D0 (see Fig. 11).
It should be noted that the reliability condition (24) 
implies that during the entire life of the US, its total tem-
perature fi eld should not be able to make the initial (de-
sign) gap smaller than the gap d tr T,( ) .
The values of the radial clearance parameters for as-
sessing reliability as a random function of time and tem-
perature can be obtained by calculating dimensional 
chains (for parameter δ), measuring the thickness of the 
solid lubricant layer and using structural constraints (for 
parameter δn), as well as calculating temperature defor-







Fig. 11. Changing of the radial clearance D: 
1 — operable hinge; 2 — failed (wedged/jammed) hinge 
4. The “jamming in the hinge assembly” type of
failure. This type of failure (sudden, restorable or non-
restorable) can be caused by the disappearance of the 
axial clearance in the hinge assembly due to temperature 
deformations. The condition for axial clearance is deter-
mined by formula 
D Dsh T l Tt t, ,( ) > ( ) (25) 
where Δsh is the actual axial clearance in the hinge 
assembly, considered as the design (quasi) deterministic 
quantity, which should always be greater than zero; Δl — 
thermal deformation as a random function of temperature 
and time, capable of causing spacer forces in the design 
of the hinge assembly in the case when Δsh < Δl.
Thermal deformation is defi ned by formula 
D = Чl l e   (26) 
where µ= D -( )t a a1 2 ; l is the distance between the 
hinges; ε is the elongation between the joints; Δt is the 
calculated temperature diff erence between the operating 
temperature in space and the rod assembly temperature 
at the plant; α1, α2 — coeffi  cients of linear thermal 
expansion of the material of the rod and body of the US.
As follows from formula (25), the reliability of the rod 
as related to its axial clearance in the hinge assembly also 
obeys the “load — resistance” model, if by load we mean 
the axial clearance parameters that change due to thermal 
deformations Δl, and by resistance — the parameter Δsh, 
that opposes the change in load. In this case, the reliabil-
ity function as related to maintaining the axial clearance 
taking into account (9) and (10) can be represented as 
R P T l T tsh sh ft t t t( ) = ( ) - ( )йл щы > Ј Ј{ }D D, , ,0 0  (27)
The admissible region for the case of jamming in the 
hinge assembly is the one-dimensional gap space Δsh in 
the form of a zero segment on the abscissa axis, which is 
equal to the design gap in magnitude.
Changes in time of the axial clearance for calculat-
ing reliability (27) can be obtained by calculating di-
mensional chains as a function of temperature (for the 
Δsh parameter) and temperature deformations (for the 
Δl parameter) (26). Here we have the case when the gap 
Δsh itself is a quasi-random quantity, depending on the 
temperature, which should always be greater than Δl.
It should be noted that failures of the type “wedging 
of the hinge” and “jamming in the hinge assembly” are the 
most common failures when deploying unique spacecraft 
structures. In foreign practice they are combined into 
the “loss of gaps” type of failures. As follows from the 
Aerospace Corporation report for 2008, analyzes of ab-
normal incidents with moving mechanical components 
of spacecraft showed that out of 164 ground and 24 or-
bital failure cases, most of them (up to 47 % of the total) 
were associated with “loss of gaps” [15].
5. The “rod engagement” type of failure. Such failure
(sudden, unrecoverable) may be caused by the occurrence 
of unforeseen obstacles in the way of rod movement, 
caused by unaccounted for conditions of weightlessness, 
vibration, kinematics of movement or unfortunate layout 
of adjacent structures, as well as incorrect actions and 
gross errors of product assembly workers. Failures of this 
type are always unexpected (belong to the black swan cat-
egory), and are the result of the lack of an algorithm for 
checking the product, ready to be sent to the launch pad, 
for its readiness for deployment in orbit. Nevertheless, 
practical cosmonautics periodically encounters such 
failures. For example, on Soyuz 1 spacecraft, one of the 
wings of the solar battery was hooked onto the screen-vac-
uum insulation mats; on the automatic US Telstar 14R, 
getting of the weakened cable harness into the deploy-
ment mechanism also led to the incomplete deployment 
of the solar panel wing [3].
The algorithm for detecting such failures involves 
construction of a full group of sequences of checks of ac-
tions preparing the unique spacecraft for perfect deploy-
ment in orbit. Calculation of the rod reliability according 
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to this criterion does not fall under the “load — resistance” 
scheme. This reliability can be assessed by construct-
ing, if possible, a complete group of “events — checks” 
sequences with subsequent computer modeling of these 
chains for assessing the probability of missing out on any 
check and sizing its consequences. To implement this ap-
proach, it is necessary to have reliable statistical data on 
the probability of human errors of installation/assembly 
workers.
Often designer is forced to compose the US system in 
a way that creates narrow three-dimensional zones of un-
hindered deployment of structures. To ensure reliability 
of deployment in such cases, it is necessary to use or-
ganized movement schemes that allow excluding hook-
ing/catching taking into account random scatter of the 
movement trajectories. In this case, devices are used to 
synchronize the movement, but the need to ensure that 
no engagement will take place still exists. Evaluation 
of the deployment success can be obtained by multiple 
computer simulations of these trajectories, taking into ac-
count the behavior of interpanel cables that can fall into 
the deployment mechanism under vibration or the influ-
ence of weightlessness.
In the general case, the meaning of all procedures for 
eliminating a failure of the “rod engagement” type is to 
assess the probability of fulfilling the condition: Qst → 0, 
where Qst is the probability of rod engagement.
Accordingly, the reliability of no engagement is deter-
mined by the expression 
Rst (t) = 1 – Qst (28) 
Thus, taking into account (17), (22), (24), (27) and 
(28), the reliability of fulfilling the condition for the rota‑
tion of the rod by a given angle when performing the TISR 
procedures can be calculated using formula (3), and, in 
case of independence of all the nine type of failures, by 
multiplying the probabilities:
R (t) = Rd · R0 (t) · Rr (t)·Rsh (t) · Rst (t).  (29) 
To assess the complete reliability of the rod rotation, 
it is necessary to calculate the reliability of each of the 
nine conditions of rod rotation, and the overall reliability 
by the formula (3) or by the structural reliability method.
6. The general algorithm
for assessing individual structural reliability 
of operating unique systems
The problem of assessing the reliability of a unique 
satellite successfully launched into orbit is a more com-
plicated task than ensuring the functional reliability of its 
launching and its deployment, since it requires knowl-
edge of stochastic/statistical characteristics of all main 
degradation processes as functions of time that have oc-
curred during all cycles of US existence (before, during 
and after the launch of the spacecraft into orbit) in all its 
structural components.
The accuracy and rigidity of the US cantilever struc-
tures in the working position are ensured by the stiffness 
and dimensional stability of the carbon fiber structural 
elements of the structures of the US and the stability of 
their relative position in the hinges. The development 
and manufacture of one-time-deployment large-size 
space structures is carried out at enterprises whose tech-
nological processes have individual specifics, but when 
producing similar objects reveal repeating characteristics. 
This allows using an approach based on the concept and 
calculations of TISR [6–13; 16, 17].
As part of this approach, following procedures must 
be completed.
1. Write down the LSF for each structural element
and the US as a whole for all possible types of
failure.
2. Formulate quantitative conditions of reliability
(or failure) for each LSF.
3. Write down the general condition for the func-
tional reliability of the product as a whole.
4. Present all the materials properties used in calcu-
lations as deterministic, random values (RV) or
functions (RF) of time, using all available infor-
mation, evaluate the quantitative values of their
parameters, and the level of their reliability.
5. Construct quantitative models of all loads and ef-
fects on the console structure (in the form of fan
processes, regression lines, Markov processes of
pure death/birth and diffusion Markov process-
es, Levy processes, etc.), find quantitative values
of its parameters, and evaluate the level of reli-
ability these values.
6. For those parameters of material properties, loads 
and influences for which the statistical base is
currently scarce, use non-traditional methods
of probability theory and mathematical statis-
tics (Bayesian approach, bootstrap, re-sampling
method, interval estimates, fuzzy logic, neural
networks, genetic algorithms, etc.).
7. Find statistical indicators of plant manufacturing
accuracy of each element of the US (measure-
ment error statistics), and slipway collectability
of each joint and the system as a whole. For this,
it is necessary to carry out appropriate multiple
measurements after each remake of the initial
semi-finished products, elements and assembly
of the entire single product.
8. Obtain statistical characteristics of: reproduc-
ibility and repeatability of measurements and of
the execution of technological operations, which
will make it possible to assess the quality of both
manufacturing and assembly technology and the
quality/reliability of the human factor (the turn-
er, the milling machine operator, the locksmith,
the assemblyman, the diagnostician, the manag-
ers, etc.).
9. Build permissible areas in the space of loads,
impacts and critical system parameters for each
element and the system as a whole, taking into
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account the possible degradation of the proper-
ties and parameters of cantilever structures.
10. Using formulas from [6–13;16–17] find the
probabilities of the vector of static, dynamic loads 
and kinematic effects and functional parameters
of the system to be in the admissible area for all
critical elements and the system as a whole and
for all possible types of its failure.
11. To assess the reliability of various components
of mass production that are part of the US, it is
possible to use the methods of accelerated reli-
ability tests, similar to how it is done for aircraft
engines [18].
12. Assess the reliability level that is actually embed-
ded in the unique design via using existing norms,
rules, and the designer’s technological techniques.
Compare the results with the specified design 
requirements in the TS and, in case of non-compliance, 
change the design and make an iterative recalculation of 
the system, until the task is unconditionally achieved.
Conclusion
The only way to ensure high reliability of unique 
USs is to raise the technology of their design, manufac-
ture and debugging to the next level, using the methodol-
ogy of high-accuracy calculation of individual structural 
reliability (based on statistics collected in new technolog-
ical conditions), to analyze and synthesize its reliability.
To avoid as much as possible black swan catastro-
phes in space or mitigate their consequences if they still 
happen, it is necessary to provide them with artificial in-
telligence and security subsystems that would provide 
on-board diagnostics, monitoring, maintenance and su-
praresilience.
It seems that the primary tasks of the practical TISR 
of the US are:
• construction of models of loads, effects and
physical-mechanical properties of materials and
structures of the US as random functions/pro-
cesses (RF) of time or RV;
• construction of correct and adequate LSFs and
AAs for typical failures of the US and its critical
components;
• assessment of the initial reliability of the unique
system R (0) and its evolution R (t) on all subse-
quent cycles of the apparatus existence;
• organizational measures for the implementation
of this project;
• the identification of the “innate level of reliabil-
ity”, spontaneously embedded into the existing
standards during the US design (to independently
confirm the acceptability of the structural and
technological approach to the design of highly
reliable USs [3, 4]);
• development of practical orbital diagnostics,
monitoring, and resilience oriented robotized
maintenance;
• assessment of the US (supra)resilience during
their debugging and operation;
• the application of the described above method-
ology of individual structural reliability above to
ensure the accident-free deployment of the US
and numerically confirm the necessary high level
of reliability during its design.
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